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GRIFFIN v. CALIFORNIA: COMMENT ON ACCUSED'S
FAILURE TO TESTIFY PROHIBITED BY THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT
The United States Supreme Court in Griffin v. California'
held that the fifth amendment 2 in its direct application to the
federal government and in its bearing on the states by reason of
the fourteenth amendment 3 forbids either comment by the prosecution on accused's silence or instruction by the court that such
silence is evidence of guilt. The decision further defined the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination, already extended
to the states in Malloy v. Hogan.4 As a direct result of this decision the constitutional and statutory provisions of the five states
permitting comment on an accused's failure to testify violate the
fifth amendment and are therefore unconstitutional. 5 The possibility also exists, however, that state statutes, such as that of
Pennsylvania,6 which prohibit only adverse comment will now be
found unconstitutional.
Petitioner, Eddie Dean Griffin, was convicted of murder in
the first degree after a jury trial in California. Griffin did not
testify at the trial and his failure to testify was commented on by
both the prosecuting attorney and the court in its instruction to
the jury. Comment by both the prosecutor and the judge was
authorized by the California Constitution. 7 Griffin appealed from
1.

380 U.S. 610 (1965).

2. U.S. Const. amend. V provides in part: "No person shall .
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ..
3.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,

.

. be

§ 1:

No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
4. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).

5. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.

1 (1964), six states permitted comment: (1) California by means of a
constitutional provision. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13; (2) Ohio by means of a
constitutional provision. OrIO CONST. art I, § 10; (3) Iowa through the

absence of an express self-incrimination privilege in its constitution. See

State v. Ferguson, 226 Iowa 361, 372-373, 283 N. W. 917, 923 (1939); (4) Con-

necticut-See State v. Heno, 119 Conn. 29, 174 Atl. 181 (1930); (5) New
Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-12-19 (1953), interpreted in State v. Sand-

oval, 59 N.M. 85, 279 P.2d 850 (1955); (6) New Jersey-Prior to Malloy,
New Jersey permitted comment. After Malloy and before Griffin, the

New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Murphy, 85 N.J. Super 391, 204
A.2d 888 (1964), decided that comment on accused's failure to testify was
violative of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 631 (1964).
7. CAL. CONST. art I, § 13 provides in part:
...in any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his
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the conviction, but the Supreme Court of California affirmed.8
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed
the conviction.9
The purpose of this note is to examine Griffin in light of its
historical natural law precedents and in light of the merits in
permitting or prohibiting comment. Using Griffin as a base, an
attempt will be made to examine the possibility of extending the
Court's holding to states other than those five to which Griffin
obviously applies. In this proposed extension of Griffin, particular
attention will be directed to Pennsylvania and its prohibition of
adverse comment. Attention will also be given to the difficulties
attendant with prohibiting comment and some suggested methods
for making this prohibition realistic will be advanced.
If the Supreme Court was justified in extending or, if not extending, in defining the fifth amendment's protection against selfincrimination as prohibiting comment on accused's failure to
testify, then at least part of that justification must be found in the
historical foundation of the privilege itself.
The history of the privilege against self-incrimination extends into the early years of the common law. 10 Undoubtedly
this early history had an important bearing on the reasons why
the framers of the Constitution included in the Bill of Rights a
provision guaranteeing a privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Almost certainly it was not imagined in 1789 that this
provision would one day prohibit comment by a prosecutor or
judge on an accused's failure to testify. In fact, at the time of the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, a defendant could not testify. It
could well be that the original provision was meant to insure that
defendant's incapacity to testify would not be removed by mere
legislation." or perhaps the privilege was meant to forbid only
such gross violation as confession obtained through the use of or
threat of torture. 2 Possibly, however, the framers of the Constitution had the unusual foresight to realize that times would
change and that this safeguard had to be flexible enough to bend
with the needs of a growing, democratic society. The theories of
what the framers intended are important only as a matter of historical interest because noble principles often transcend their
origin and some creative misunderstandings account for our most
failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts
in the case against him may be commented upon by the court and

by counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury.
8. 60 Cal.2d 182, 383 P.2d 432 (1965).

9. 380 U.S. at 615.
10. See, e.g., East India Co. v. Campbell, 1 Ves. Sen. 246, 27 Eng.
Rep. 1010 (1749); see generally 8 WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 2251 (McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961).
11.

MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 122 (1954).

12. E.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 119 (1908); see also
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 53 (1964).
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cherished values and institutions. 13 "If," wrote Mr. Justice
Holmes, "truth were not often suggested by error, if old implements could not be adjusted to new uses, human progress would
be slow.' 4 Even though the original intended purposes for the
fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination have little
bearing on its present meaning or scope of application, it is
nevertheless necessary to examine the historical trend of judicial
thought in order to determine the development of the privilege
and its present application.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT:

1789 TO WILSON

By 1789, the United States had added to its written constitution a Bill of Rights. In that Bill of Rights the fifth amendment
declared that "no person . .. shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself. . . ." The problem still
remained, however, for the courts to give meaning to these words.
Within a short period of time all of the original thirteen colonies,
with the exception of New Jersey, adopted similar provisions in
their state constitutions. 15 Subsequently, as each state was admitted to the union, all except Iowa adopted a similar guarantee. 16
In 1833, the Supreme Court in Barron v. City of Baltimore,7
reached a decision that was to influence the application, and
therefore the divergent development of the privilege against selfincrimination. The specific issue in Barron involved only the payment of just compensation for property taken by the city, but the
opinion contained dictum that strongly indicated that none of the
Bill of Rights provisions extended to the states.
The dictum in Barron had little early application to the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination, since until 1864
an accused could not testify on his own behalf. The accused could
testify only as to extenuating circumstances and in those instances
the problem of self-incrimination did not arise. This situation
began to change in 1864 when Maine,' 8 followed shortly by the
federal government, 9 Massachusetts, 20 Pennsylvania, 2 1 and nearly
every other state in the union passed a statute giving the accused
the capacity to testify. It was feared that the granting of the
13. United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581 (2d Cir. 1956)
(Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
14. Wesler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606 (1945).
15. E.g., PA. CONST. art I, § 9: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused . . . cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself ... "
16. See 8 WIGMORE, op cit. supra note 10, § 2252.
17. 10 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
18. ME.REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1315 (1964).
19. 20 Stat. 30 (1878), as amended 62 Stat. 833 (1948), 18 U.S.C.
§ 3481 (1964).
20. MAss. GEN. LAw ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (1958).
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 631 (1964).
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capacity to testify standing by itself was self-incrimination. 22
Thus many states23 followed or accompanied their capacity statutes
with statutes forbidding comment on accused's failure to exercise this new right. 24 The federal government and the majority
of the states basically agreed that permitting comment on an accused's failure to testify was incompatable with a privilege against
self-incrimination, but the standards of application of that privilege quickly grew divergent.
In 1868, the fourteenth amendment with its due process
clause was ratified. At that time it was claimed by many that the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment had but one
purpose: to reverse the decision in Barron.2 5 Consequently, it
was argued that the fifth amendment should now be applicable to
the states. The privileges and immunities referred to in the fourteenth amendment are those guaranteed federally in the Bill of
Rights. No new rights or privileges were created by the fourteenth amendment. Rather it ordained that the existing privileges and immunities should not be abridged by the states. 26 This
argument was rejected by the Supreme Court in the Slaughter
House Cases.27 The Court held that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment did not apply per se all of the privileges
and immunities of the Bill of Rights to the states. 28 The Court
reasoned that state and national citizenship are distinguishable and
that the fourteenth amendment affects only national citizenship. 29
Further, an application to the states of the Bill of Rights privileges would result in Congress becoming a perpetual censor upon
state legislatures. In doing so Congress would destroy the balance
of powers necessary for a workable federalism. 0
In 1893, the problem of comment on an accused's failure to
testify reached the Supreme Court for the first time in Wilson v.
United States.31 The Slaughter House rule, however, was not
22. See State v. Baker, 115 Vt. 94, 53 A.2d 53 (1947); State v. Cameron,

40 Vt. 555, 565 (1867).

23. See note 5 supra for a listing of those states which did not forbid
comment either through statute or statutory interpretation.
24. MASs. GEN. LAw ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (1958).
25. E.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1948); Slaughter House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).

26. This view, embraced by Mr. Justice Field's dissenting opinion in
the Slaughter House Cases, was adopted in Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404
(1935). This case, however, was in turn overruled by Madden v. Kentucky,
309 U.S. 83 (1940).
27. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).

28. Id.at 81.
29. Id. at 73-75.
30. Id. at 78.
31. 149 U.S. 60 (1893). The Court held that comment on an accused's
failure to testify violated the federal statute in that such comment tended
toward creating a presumption of guilt based upon an accused's failure to
testify.
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challenged since Wilson was a federal case not involving an extension of the fifth amendment to the states. Furthermore, the
situation was covered by statute3 2 and did not require an interpretation of the constitutionality of comment on an accused's failure to testify. The Court, however, did strongly indicate that
even if the statute had not prohibited comment on an accused's
failure to testify, such practice would nevertheless run counter to
fifth amendment protection since it tends to create a presumption
of guilt based on the exercise of a constitutional right.
A

NATURAL LAW JUSTIFICATION:

TWINING

TO PALKO

In 1908, fifteen years after the Supreme Court had decided
Wilson, the issue of comment upon an accused's failure to testify
33
again confronted the Supreme Court in Twining v. New Jersey.
This time, unlike Wilson, a constitutional question was involved.
Here a judge in the trial court3 4 had instructed the jury that they
might draw an unfavorable inference from defendant's failure to
testify. After defendant had exhausted his state court appeals,3 5
the Supreme Court of the United States granted a writ of certiorari. Twining's contention was that compulsory self-incrimination had been forced upon him in violation of due process of law
and the privileges and immunities guaranteed to him as a citizen
of the United States. Defendant did not directly invoke the fifth
amendment, 36 but rather claimed that the privileges and immunities referred to in the fourteenth amendment are those privileges
and immunities enumerated in the Bill of Rights which are incorporated by reference into the fourteenth amendment's application to the several states. Thus, it was argued that the fifth
amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was
incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. Since comment is
compulsion, the state had violated his federally protected consti37
tutional privileges. The Twining Court rejected this contention.
They assumed, without deciding, that comment on an accused's
failure to testify would be a violation of the fifth amendment
32. 20 Stat. 30 (1878).
33. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
34. Monmouth Court of quarter sessions in New Jersey. Twining and
another were convicted for knowingly exhibiting a false paper to a state
bank examiner.
35. New Jersey v. Twining, 14 N.J.L. 683 (1906).
36. Evidently Twining felt that it had been decided that the fifth
amendment did not extend to the states. It was true that Barron had held
that that part of the fifth amendment that had prohibited the taking of
property by the government without just compensation was not directly
applicable to the states and that there was strong dicta in Barron that
indicated that none of the privileges and immunities were applicable but
that was before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, and the possibility that the fourteenth would apply the fifth to the states.
37. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. at 113.
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guarantee against self-incrimination; 5 then the Court held that
this privilege was not extended to the states by reason of being
incorporated into the fourteenth amendment.39 In justifying their
refusal to extend the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to the states, the Twining Court relied heavily on the reasoning of the Slaughter House Cases. Twining was based on the
existence of dual citizenship, state and national, with certain inalienable rights belonging to the citizens of both governments.
It is the duty and perogative of the individual government to
grant and protect those rights. The Court felt that only those
rights and privileges concerned with the very essence of national
government could be federally regulated, and that the privilege
against self-incrimination was not such a privilege. 40 In making
their assumption that comment on an accused's failure to testify
is a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court
describes this privilege as "a fundamental right belonging to all
who live under a free government and incapable of impairment by
legislative or judicial decision."' 4 1 The Court further stated that
the privilege is a right inherent in state citizenship.42 It did not
discuss, however, what recourse a state citizen would have when
he is deprived of a fundamental and natural right, once the federal
courts have been closed to him. For example, New Jersey had no
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. 43 Comment
was permitted upon an accused's failure to testify and yet the
Supreme Court assumed without deciding that such comment was
a violation of a fundamental right guaranteed to all free men of
all free governments. If this assumption was valid, then Twining
in effect said that it was permissible for a state to deprive its
citizens of rights fundamental to all free men and to do so
without its citizens having any recourse except to the very court
that had deprived them of that right.
Another fallacy in Twining was that the Court assumed that
it had already been conclusively decided that none of the privileges and immunities described in the Bill of Rights dealing with
other than national rights, were extended to the states by the
45
It was
fourteenth amendment. 44 This in fact was not the case.
cases 46
several
in
effect
this
to
dicta
strong
true that there was
38. Id.at 97.
39. Id.at 99.
40. Id. at 97-99.
41. Id.at 97.

42. Id. at 96.
43. E.g., State v. White, 27 N.J. 158, 168-69, 142 A.2d 65, 70 (1958);
State v. Toscano, 13 N.J. 418, 433, 100 A.2d 170, 172 (1953).
44. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. at 96.
45. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 70 (1947) (dissenting
opinion).
46. E.g., Barrington v. Missouri, 205 U.S. 483 (1906); Barr v. New
Jersey, 175 U.S. 172 (1899); Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887).
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and that the Court had refused to extend several specific privileges of the Bill of Rights. 47 None of these decisions, however,
had decided that all provisions of the Bill of Rights were not applicable to the states. In fact, even the strong dicta in the
Slaughter House Cases had been undermined twelve years before
Twining, in Chicago B. & 0. R.R. v. Chicago,4' when the Court,
under a new due process natural law formula, held that the fourteenth amendment forbade49 a state from taking private property
without just compensation.
The solid precedents upon which Twining was based did not
long remain intact. The Supreme Court after Twining extended
several of the privileges and immunities of the Bill of Rights to
the states. 50 In Brown v. Mississippi,51 the Court went through
the pretense of distinguishing Twining52 while holding that a conviction resting solely upon a confession extorted by an officer of
the state was inconsistent with the due process of law required
by the fourteenth amendment. 53 The Court granted relief because
the state is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own conception of policy, except when the regulation "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
'54
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.
The Court was now saying that those rights considered to be
"fundamental rights" were rights that would be federally protected. Brown, in extending to the states a federally protected
right, was justifying that extension with the same theory that
the Twining Court had used to deny the extension.
Brown was a much needed advancement. Now the citizens of
the individual states had recourse for fundamental injustices to a
source other than that which had denied them the right in the
first place. The weakness of the decision was that it was based
upon the concept of a "fundamental right." This term was a
natural law concept. The question remained: who was capable
of determining what rights were so rooted in the tradition and
47. Prior to Twining, the Supreme Court had held that the following
were not privileges and immunities of state citizenship: (1) the eighth
amendment guarantee against cruel and barbarous punishment. In re
Hemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1889); (2) the seventh amendment guarantee or
jury trial. Walker v. Sauvenet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875); (3) the second amendment right of people to keep and bear arms. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S.

252 (1885); (4) the fifth and sixth amendment requirements for indictment

in capital or other criminal offense. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1899).
48. 166 U.S. 226 (1896).

49.
50.
Brady,
Snyder
51.

Id. at 241.
E.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1946); Betts v.
316 U.S. 455 (1942); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937);
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1933).
297 U.S. 278 (1935).

52. Id. at 285.
53. Id. at 286.
54. Id. at 285.
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conscience of the people as to be ranked fundamental? Moreover, which provisions of the Bill of Rights were to be considered
fundamental? Even if a right or privilege was determined to be
"fundamental," the problem remaining was whether the fringe
areas of that privilege would also be fundamental. Perhaps selfincrimination through a confession obtained by torture might
immediately be recognized as a violation of a "fundamental right,"
but would such a thing as comment be recognized as fundamental?
Brown had challenged the basis of Twining. In 1937, however,
Twining was given new strength when the Court in Palko v.
Connecticut5 restated its position in refusing to apply the fifth
amendment protection to the states. Palko dealt specifically with
the question of double jeopardy;56 but defendant's claim was identical to that in Twining, namely, that whatever violated the
fifth amendment in its national application, violated the fourteenth amendment in its application to the states. The Palko
Court, as it did in Twining, rejected the contention.5 7 Although
the Palko Court cited Twining as authority,58 their reasoning
greatly differed from that of the Twining Court. The Twining
Court had reasoned that only those federally protected rights
concerned with the essence of national government would be
extended by the fourteenth amendment.5 9 In the decisions after
Twining, however, the extensions had not been so limited.60 Thus
the Palko Court was forced to formulate a new justification for
refusing to extend fifth amendment protection: it reasoned that
only certain of the privileges and immunities of the Bill of Rights
are fundamental to an ordered concept of liberty and only these
fundamental rights will be extended."'
The protection against
compulsory self-incrimination was given as an example of a protection that was not fundamental in that it was not implied in
the ordered concept of liberty. It could easily be lost and justice
still be done.6 2 The Palko Court, in explaining which rights were
55.

302 U.S. 319 (1937).

56. Palko claimed that Connecticut statute permitting the state to
appeal in a criminal prosecution was, in effect, double jeopardy and there-

fore unconstitutional in that it violated the fourteenth amendment.
at 323.
57.
58.

Ibid.
Id. at 324.

Id.

.

59. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. at 84.
60. After Twining and before Palko the Court extended the following
privileges: (1) freedom of speech. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364
(1936) and Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 259 (1936); (2) freedom of
the press. Grosjeon v. American- Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1935) and Near
v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1939); (3) free exercise of
religion, Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 262 (1934).
Cf. Pierce v.
Society of Sisters. 268 U.S. 510 (1924); (4) right of one accused of crime
to the benefit of counsel.- Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
61. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. at 328.
62. Mr. Justice Cardozo speaking for the Court in Palko said:
"Few would be so narrow or provincial as to maintain that a fair and en-
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fundamental and which were not, admitted that the dividing line
appeared to be waivering and broken, but maintained that such a
line could be determined by reflection, analysis and a thorough
study and appreciation of the meaning of liberty itself.6 3
Twining, Brown and Palko all based either the extension of a
federally protected privilege or the denial of that extension on
the consideration of whether the right was fundamental. Undoubtedly, each Court had sound policy reasons for deciding
whether a particular right was fundamental. The Courts, however, never mentioned these reasons. Instead, what was considered to be a fundamental right was determined by such cliches
as a "study of the meaning of liberty itself, ' 64 "right obvious to
all men of all times," 65 and other natural law concepts. It would
appear that the term "fundamental right" when used in describing
a right obvious to all men at all times has very little objective
meaning, at least not sufficient reason upon which to base a
decision.6 6 Even if it could be assumed that differences as to
moral attitudes did not vary from one society to another, and
that a concept of right and wrong did not vary from generation to
generation, the term "fundamental right" would still be of little
value in the application of law. Of the thousands of cases that
would deal with any one fact situation, a thousand different variations could be presented. Somewhere in that maze of cases
would be a hazy dividing line between what is right and what is
wrong. At that point, identity of belief about a general sense of
justice will not produce identity of belief about any one particular
set of facts. Everyone's individual moral attitude is usually hidden, but such attitudes do affect a person's decision as to what is
right or wrong and what is necessary or unnecessary. Thus, it is
difficult to understand how a particular group of humans at a
particular time and setting can determine what is a "fundamental
right to all men of all ages." 67
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
LISBENBA TO HOGAN

EXTENDED:

The Court's refusal to extend the fifth amendment to the
states as well as its application of natural law concepts reached its
lightened system of justice would be impossible without the immunity

from compulsory self-incrimination."

Id. at 325.

Compare Matter of

Doyle, 257 N.Y. 244, 177 N.E. 489, 491 (1931) wherein Mr. Justice Cardozo

said: "It [the privilege against self-incrimination] is a barrier interposed

between the individual and the power of the government, a barrier interposed by the sovereign people of the state; and neither legislators nor
judges are free to overleap it."

63. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. at 325.
64. Id. at 326.
65. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. at 285 (1935).
66. Konigsburg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 56, 62-71 (1960)

(Black, J. dissenting).
67. FRANK, COURTS

ON TRIAL,

346-373 (1950).
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highpoint in Palko. The marked shift to the federal standard in
6
state cases probably began in 1942 with Lisbenba v. California.
"
The Court spoke of "accused's free choice to admit, to deny, or to
refuse to answer." 69 The big shift, however, became marked in
1947 in Adamson v. California.7
In Adamson the Court was faced with a fact situation similar
to that which had been presented in Twining and that which was
to later be presented in Griffin. In a 5-4 decision, the Court followed Twining, but they abandoned the natural law justification
that had been blurring the issue, and adopted instead a theory
based upon what the majority considered to be the merits. Adamson had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death.7 1 Pursuant to the California Constitution,72 both the prosecution and the
judge commented on accused's failure to testify. Defendant
claimed that the California provision allowing comment was contra to the fourteenth amendment. He claimed that the privileges and immunities referred to there included the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination. This contention was
once again rejected. In so doing, the Court retreated to a preTwining foundation, placing emphasis on the federal nature of
our government and on the concept of dual citizenship. The privilege against self-incrimination is a privilege derived from state
citizenship. Hence, the state may abridge that privilege.7 3
As in Twining, the Court here assumed that comment on accused's failure to testify did abridge the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Unlike Twining, however, the
Adamson Court made the assumption in order to determine appellant's fourteenth amendment contention. The Twining Court implied that if it decided that the fourteenth amendment's privileges
and immunities clause included the fifth amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination, then it would find with certainty that
comment violated this privilege. 74 The Court in Adamson, however, after making the assumption, went on to discuss the comment
rules on the merits. Even if they found that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination applied to the states by
the fourteenth amendment, it appears that they would also have
found that comment on accused's failure to testify had not vio75
lated the fifth amendment.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

314 U.S. 219 (1942).
Id. at 241; see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. at 3.
332 U.S. 46 (1947).
California v. Adamson, 27 Cal.2d 478, 165 P.2d 3 (1946).
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. at 51.
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. at 97.

75. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. at 56 (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
Justice Black, in dissent, took up the claim of Justice Field's dissent in
the Slaughter House Case. Id. at 68. The other three dissenting Justices
were not willing to embrace so broad an application, but they did feel that
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Adamson was- important in several ways: for the first time
since Slaughter -House, there was a strong dissent in favor of extending the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination to
the states; for the first time in dealing with this specific area, the
Supreme Court had abandoned the natural law theories and had
cleared the air for a discussion based on the merits. Once the
general, all-embracing natural concepts, such as "fundamental
right," "scheme of ordered liberty," had been cleared away, the
real problem could be seen and some direction could be given to
this area of the law. No longer did a defendant have to contend
with the waivering line of fundamental rights.7 6 The Supreme
Court once again had some degree of predictability.
The hint in Adamson that the Supreme Court was ready to
extend the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination77
was reinforced in 1961 when the Court decided Cohen v. Hurley.
Actually, at a casual glance, the Court came no closer to extending
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination in Cohen
than they had in Adamson. With four justices dissenting, 78 it was
held that the fourteenth amendment did not forbid the state from
using an attorney's refusal to answer questions as to the propriety
of his professional conduct as a per se ground for disbarment. 79
The majority, however, hinted that it was ready to extend the
protection against self-incrimination to the states if the right set
of circumstances was presented -for its determination. The Court
stated that the absence of federal protection of the guarantee
against self-incrimination did not mean that states have free rein
in forcing testimony or in drawing inferences from a refusal to
testify. 80 In order to make out a violation, however, a defendant
must show more than that state procedures have a tendency to
discourage the withholding of self-incriminatory testimony.8'
In 1964 the situation hinted at in Cohen presented itself in
Malloy v. Hogan.8 2 The Court held that the fifth amendment's
exception from compulsory self-incrimination is protected by the
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination should be applied
to the states through the fourteenth. Id. at 123.
76. 'Palko v;:.Connecticut, 302 U.S. at 323.
77.

366 U.S. 117 (1961).

78. The dissent in Hurley claimed the majority was wrong in their
piecemeal application of rights because they are included in a conception of
due process of law. This, they claimed, is giving due process an "independent potency" not resting on the Bill of Rights. The dissenters felt
that this process led to the administering of a subjective, watered down
version of th&" individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights when state cases
came before the Supreme Court. Id. at 131.
79.

Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. at 127-129.

80. Id. at 121.
81. Id. at 129.
"
82. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). In Malloy, the accused was jailed for contempt
for refusal to answer certain questions in a state gambling proceeding. See
150 Conn. 220, 187 A.2d 744.

Fall 1965]

NOTES

fourteenth amendment against abridgement by the states. The
Court in Malloy noted that:
The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion
the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees
against federal infringement-the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfiltered
exercise of his own will, and3 to suffer no penalty, as held
in Twining, for such silence.
Thus, fifty-six years after the Twining Court had decided
that the fifth amendment protection was not extended to the
states through the fourteenth amendment, the Malloy Court reversed itself and found that now this protection against compulsory self-incrimination was extended to state procedure. The two
decisions, however, are not incompatable. What was involved in
Malloy was not an analysis of the historical foundations of
Twining, or of the interpretation of those foundations, but rather
a changing concept of due process. The Court stated in Wolf v.
Colorado8 4 that "it is of the essence of a free society to advance in
its standards of what is deemed reasonable and right."' 5 Due
process, if it is to serve its intended function, reflects these
changing standards. Due process is the total of all of those rights
which the Court feels must be enforced because they are basic to
our society. As such, it is quite conceivable that what was deemed
unreasonable in 1908,86 a little less so in 1939,87 and a closely
contested question in 1948,88 should in 1964 be adopted as the law
of the land. 9 The Court in Malloy was faced with a situation
very different from that in Twining. Federal activity in state
criminal proceeding had been established and there was less
insistance on the careful balancing of powers that existed in
1908.90 In 1908 any attempt to extend a right protecting one accused of a criminal violation would have been considered to be a
gross invasion of states rights. A strong local interest demanding
protection from criminal violation 9' completed only with an ideal.
83.
84.

Id. at 8.
338 U.S. 25 (1949).

85. Id. at 27.

86. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
87. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1939).
88. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1948).
89. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1.
90. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n. 378 U.S. 52, 55. Mr. Justice
Goldberg talked of the policy of "cooperative federalism" whereby the state
and federal government are waging a united front against many types of

criminal activity.
91.

E.g., Commonwealth v. Donaugh, 377 Pa. 46, 103 A.2d 694 (1954)

wherein the court said:
In the last few years murder and similar crimes of violence
have multiplied and have frequently been accompanied by barbar-

ous brutalities which have shocked America. Every person accused

of crime-even an oft-convicted criminal-is surrounded by con-

stitutional and legal safeguards and the Courts have leaned over
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Not only did this strong local interest run counter to any extension
of federal power to state criminal procedure, but in addition
Congress had given very little guidance in the form of legislation. 2 Thus, it was left to the Court to accomplish any extension
of federal control over state criminal procedure that was to occur.
In 1908, being without precedent for the extension of any Bill of
Rights privileges, 93 it seems logical that the Court would first
extend those rights closest to the people, 94 and then, based upon
this precedent, extend federal protection of privileges and immunities concerned with state criminal law procedure as it became necessary.
Even after precedent had been established, the Court in fact
situations similar to that in Twining still did not extend the fifth
amendment protection against self-incrimination. 5 Perhaps the
reason may partially be that it has only been since Adamson
that the privilege has become more than an ideal. There had been
a strong undercurrent to abolish or at least limit the privilege
against self-incrimination.9 6 It was argued that the privilege was
an impediment to a logical criminal proceeding, 97 that it was the
privilege of crime9 8 and that accused's rights are amply protected without it. 9 9 With this undercurrent of responsible opinion
to either limit or abolish the privilege against self-incrimination
added to the factors of a jealous protection of federalism and a
strong local interest running counter to any further protection of
backwards to protect his rights. Demands for new and extended
rights for those accused of heinous crimes are constantly being
made, with no thought for the rights, the safety, the welfare or the

protection of Society, or for the feelings or rights of the victim's
bereaved family. The Commonwealth usually has a very difficult
task-first to capture and then to convict a murderer or dangerous

criminal .... While Courts must continue to protect the conditional and legal rights of every person . . .they should give care-

ful consideration to the safety and the lives of law-abiding citizens.

Id. at 57, 103 A.2d at 700.
92. See Schaefer, Federal and State Criminal Procedure, 70

HARV.

L. REV. 1 (1956).

93. See cases cited note 47 supra, for a partial listing of specific privileges found not to apply to the states prior to Twining.
94. Since 1925, decisions have extended all of the first amendment
protection of freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly and petition to
state citizens. E.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1946);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1924).
95. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
96. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937): "Few would be so

narrow or provincial as to maintain that a fair and enlightened system of
justice would be impossible without them," referring to immunity from
compulsory self-incrimination. Id. at 325-26 (Cardozo, J.).
97. MEYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? 229-31 (1959).
98. State v. Wentworth, 65 Me. 234, 241 (1875); see generally BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827); 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 446-47, 451-52 (Browing ed. 1893).
99. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 12-14 (1959).
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the accused, it is understandable that for a long period the Court
chose to follow Twining.
It may well be that the privilege against self-incrimination
didn't again become a living, fundamental privilege until the nation had seen both the result of its absence in the totalitarian
regimes 00° and its abuse both federally and on a state level during McCarthy-type legislative hearings. 101 These factors added
to the building momentum of federal supervision over state criminal procedure and a renewed civil sensitivity toward constitutional guarantees in closely related areas. These were finally
sufficient to convince the Court that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is a "fundamental" right, a right which
could not be lost and justice still be done.
COMMENT

Statutory or ConstitutionalQuestion
The Supreme Court had faced the question of comment as
both a statutory issue 10 2 and a constitutional issue. 103 Nevertheless, it had never been decided whether comment violated the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. It had never
been necessary to decide this question. On each occasion the state
comment question had come before the Court as a constitutional
question with regard to the fifth amendment's application to the
fourteenth amendment. When comment had come before the
Court in a federal case, the situation had been covered by statute. 0 4 Thus once Malloy extended the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination to the states, it became necessary
to determine whether comment by the prosecutor or judge in a
state court violated the fifth amendment.
Shortly after the decision in Malloy, several cases reached the
state courts and presented for the first time the problem of comment as a violation of the fifth amendment protection against
100. See United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 682 (2d Cir. 1956),
rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).

101. See Boudin, The Constitutional Privilege in Operation, 12 LAW.
GUMD REV. 128, 149 (1952); Clapp, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
10 RUTGERS L. REV. 541, 543 (1956); See also Auippa v. United States, 201

F.2d 287 (6th Cir. 1952).
• . . we are unable to give judicial sanction, in the teeth of the fifth
amendment, to the employment by a committee of the United

States Senate of methods of examination of witnesses constituting a
(1) answer truly you will be convicted (2) answer
triple threat:
falsely and you will be convicted of perjury (3) refuse to answer
and you will be found guilty of criminal contempt.
Id. at 300.
102. Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893).
103. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
104. 20 Stat. 30 (1878), 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1964).
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compulsory self-incrimination. 10 5 These state courts could not resolve the conflict. In fact, they were split on its determination;
they had, however, faced the problem furnishing a basis for the
Court to draw from when the problem finally reached it in
Griffin.10 6
Of the six states permitting comment by the judge or prosecutor, 10 7 cases involving the constitutionality of comment reached
the supreme court of two of them, 10 and a habeas corpus proceeding dealt with the constitutionality of permitting comment in
a third.0 9 In State v. Murphy 10 the court held that comment by
the judge on an accused's failure to testify violated the fifth and
The court felt
fourteenth amendments of the Constitution."'
that adverse comment by a trial judge was in fact a 2type of
penalty for not testifying already condemned in Malloy.1
California, in People v. Modesto," 3 decided only a short time
after Murphy, held that comment by a trial judge and prosecutor
on failure of defendant to testify did not infringe defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination. 1 4 The California court stated
that the federal prohibition of comment was purely statutory and
that the state must follow only the constitutional and not the
statutory aspects of the privilege. 15 The court also felt that
comment on defendant's failure to testify does not result in a
"penalty" prohibited by the fourteenth amendment. Not only
was Modesto contra to Murphy, but it was also in conflict with
the guideline set by the court of appeals in Shott v. Tehon.116 In
a habeas corpus proceeding by a state court prisoner, the court
held that although the Ohio Constitution"' provided that failure
of an accused to testify might be considered by the court and
commented on by counsel, the right of accused in a state court
prosecution not to be compelled to testify included, under the
fifth and fourteenth amendments, the right that his refusal to
testify will not be commented on by prosecution.
105. Shott v. Tehon, 337 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1964); People v. Modesto,
42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 398 P.2d 753 (1965); State v. Murphy, 85 N.J. Super. 391,
204 A.2d 888 (1964).
106. 381 U.S. 957.
107. See cases cited note 5 supra.
108. See State v. Murphy, 85 N.J. Super. 391, 204 A.2d 888 (1964);
People v. Modesto, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 398 P.2d 753 (1965).
109. See Shot v. Tehon, 337 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1964).
110. 85 N.J. Super. 391, 204 A.2d 888 (1964). Defendant was convicted of stealing personal property. At his trial, the judge commented on
defendant's failure to take the stand.
111. Id. at 396, 204 A.2d at 893.

112. Ibid.
113. 42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 398 P.2d 753 (1965).
114. Id. at 425, 398 P.2d at 761.

115. Id. at 424, 398 P.2d at 760.
116.

Id. at 426, 398 P.2d at 762.

117. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10.
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The Merits
In Murphy, Modesto and Shott the question of whether comment on accused's failure to testify violated the fifth and fourteenth amendments was decided on the basis of the merits involved in permitting or denying comment. The court in each case
was without binding precedent, but they were not without analogy, for over a period of time several guidelines had evolved:
(1) the Supreme Court had been faced with the statutory question of comment on accused's failure to testify and had on several
occasions remarked as to the foundation and the merits of prohibiting comment; 118 (2) although both Adamson and Twining
held that the fourteenth amendment did not apply the fifth
amendment to the states, the Court in both cases eluded to the
merits and dangers in permitting comment; (3) state supreme
courts had decided the constitutionality of comment. These constitutional interpretations were based on provisions similar to the
federal privilege.1 1 9 These guidelines along with the basic policy
considerations of the privilege itself have evolved consideration
both for and against the prohibition of comment.
The privilege against self-incrimination does not prohibit all
self-incrimination, but only that which is involved through compulsion. In order to find that comment on accused's failure to
testify violated the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, it is necessary to find that such comment was in fact
compelled. 120 If it is found that comment is compelled, it must
next be found that it is compulsion to such a degree that it is
violative of due process of law, for a practice which merely discourages an accused from testifying is not violative of due process
of law.

12 1

It is submitted that if the protection is to be realistic, it
must necessarily prohibit not only physical, but mental compulsion as well. 22 Comment, if it be compulsion, would, of
course, be of the latter type. Advocates of permitting Comment
claim that comment is not direct compulsion 23since the defendant
retains a choice of testifying or not testifying.
118.

E.g., Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1942); Bruno v.

United States, 308 U.S. 287 (1959); Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60
(1892).

119. Compare Opinion of the Justices, 300 Mass. 620, 15 N.E.2d 662

(1938) and State v. Wolfe, 64 S.D. 178, 266 N.W. 116 (1936) (comment
unconstitutional) with State v. Sandoval, 59 N.M. 85, 279 P.2d 850 (1955)
and State v. Baker, 115 Vt. 94, 53 A.2d 53 (1947) (comment constitutional).
120. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1911). Mr. Justice Holmes

said: "But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a
witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from him." Id. at 252-53.
121. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. at 124.
122. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. at 252.
123.

E.g.,

People v. Modesto, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 398 P.2d 753 (1965);

People v. Adamson, 27 Cal.2d 478, 487, 165 P.2d 3 (1946).
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Some feel that the fifth amendment only protects a person
from being compelled in any criminal case to give evidence
against himself. Comment is not direct compulsion; it is at most
moral coercion. 124 Confronting accused with his accusor is an
example of moral coercion. In fact, all of the elements of a
criminal trial are a form of moral coercion tending to force testimony from the lips of accused. There is, however, substantial
agreement that these other elements of the trial are not violative
of the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. 125
It is true that many of the elements of a criminal trial, including facing the accused with his accusors, may have the tendency to force the accused to testify. There is, however, a fundamental difference between facing the accused with his accusors
and permitting comment on the failure of accused to testify.
The former was implemented for the protection of accused whereas
the latter, if allowed, tends to limit the rights of accused. If
facing the accused with his accusor has the tendency to compel
defendant to testify, it is allowed because this moral compulsion
is less of an invasion of defendant's rights than to permit secret
accusations to be the basis of prosecution. Certainly comment
is not compulsion of a physical nature; nevertheless it is real compulsion in that it creates a situation whereby the accused is
penalized for invoking a constitutional privilege. 12 -6 The prosecutor is allowed to use the fact that the accused has not testifed to
implant a presumption of guilt into the minds of the jury.
Proponents of the comment rules, however, feel that comment
27
It
does not implant a presumption in the mind of the jurors.
is claimed that any presumption to be derived from accused's not
taking the stand is already complete upon accused's failure to
take the stand. 128 The average juror, it is contended, realizes
that the accused has the privilege to testify. If he does not testify,
he is obviously hiding his guilt.1 29 In fact, it is maintained that
this viewpoint, previously supported only by scholarly and judicial opinion, is now statistically supported. In a test group surveyed, of those who understood the question, 71 per cent con124.

E.g., State v. Baker, 115 Vt. 94, 101, 53 A.2d 53, 60 (1947); State

v. Wolfe, 64 S.D. 178, 266 N.W. 116 (1936) (dissenting opinion); see Bruce,
The Right to Comment on the Failure of the Defendant to Testify, 31
MICH. L. REV. 226, 233 (1932).
(dis125. See State v. Wolfe, 64 S.D. 178, 266 N.W. 116 (1936)
senting opinion).
126. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. at 614.
127. See Parker v. State, 61 N.J.L. 308, 39 Atl. 651 (1898), aff'd, 62
"Such an inference is natural and irreN.J.L. 801, 45 Atl. 1092 (1898).
sistable. It will be drawn by honest jurymen, and no instruction will
prevent it." Id. at 314, 39 Atl. at 654. See Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. at 60; State v. Grebe, 17 Kan. 458 (1877); State v. Cleaver, 59 Me.
298 (1871).

128.

See State v. Wolfe, 64 S.D. 178, 266 N.W. 116 (1936).

129.

MEYERS, SHALL WE AMEND

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT?

20 (1959).
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sidered a claim of the privilege not to testify indicated guilt.13 0
Thus, it is claimed, if the inference of guilt already exists, why
should it be allowed to roam unchecked in the minds of the jurors?
Why should it not be limited or directed by permitting comment
on the failure to testify since nothing that could be said by the
prosecutor could enlarge the inference already formed?' 3 '
First, the supposed statistics of the poll do not create a true
picture. The poll begs the question. By the mere procedure of
posing the question to the individual interviewed the pollor calls
to this person's mind the fact that the accused has invoked a
constitutional privilege which protects him from testifying. The
contention attempted to be supported is that the inference of
guilt exists without attention being called to it by the prosecutor
or judge. Here, however, the question itself is serving the purpose of comment. It calls attention to the fact that the accused
has not testified. It then proceeds to establish what per cent of
those questioned, after they have thought about the question, find
exercise of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
an inference of guilt. Secondly, the answers accepted were limited
to those thought to have understood the question. Of all those
questioned, 42 per cent did not understand the term fifth132amendPosment as granting a privilege against self-incrimination.
sibly a large portion of the group did not realize that the accused
had a right not to testify. If this group were to be placed in a
jury situation, it may well be that they would not even notice
that the defendant had not taken the stand. It seems that the
only conclusion that can be drawn from this particular poll is
that, even after having been alerted to the situation, at least 20
per cent of those questioned33would not infer guilt from the mere
failure of accused to testify.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court in Bruno V.
United States,'3 4 said:
And when it is urged that it is a psychological impossibility not to have a presumption arise in the minds of jurors
against an accused who fails to testify, the short answer is
that Congress legislated on a contrary assumption and not
without experience. It was for Congress to decide if what
it deemed legally significant was psychologically futile.
Certainly, despite the vast accumulations of psychological
data, we have not yet attained that certitude about the
human mind which would justify us in disregarding the
will of Congress. 135
130.
stitute of
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

op. cit. supra note 128, at 20-26 relying on American InPublic Opinion Release, May 2, 1957.
See People v. Modesto, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 398 P.2d 753 (1965).
See MYERS, Op. cit. supra note 127, at 253 n.2.
Id. at 21.
308 U.S. 287 (1939).
Id. at 294.
MEYERS,
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.
Another contention- for the continuation of the comment rule
is that the-original legislation permitting defendant to testify was
for the protection of the innocent. If defendant is innocent, he
has every inducement to testify, for truth will be his shield. If
defendant does not testify, then that fact should be called to the
attention of the jury136as part of the occurrences tending to link
accused to the crime.
This contention makes several assumptions, not all of which
are valid. 13v The basic assumption is that truth will protect the
innocent. This assumes that accused will be able to convey what
is actually the truth and that the jury will be able to perceive
what to them is the truth. The assumption that truth will shield
would be valid if the process of conveyance from accused to the
jury did not involve communication. Unfortunately, it does. It
is, therefore, virtually impossible for twelve persons of varied
background, education and experience to simultaneously perceive
the meaning intended by a thirteenth, the accused.
Although the accused is theoretically innocent until proven
guilty, in fact, at trial, the defendant does not enjoy the position
of a totally neutral state which changes only with the evidence.
Merely by being forced to appear at trial to determine his guilt or
innocence, the defendant is burdened with the "halter of accusation."'1 38 The accusation has been made by one clothed with authority. From the outset of the trial defendant's words and actions
are Viewed with -the critical eye of suspicion. Moreover, even if
accused intends to tell a truthful story, he has every inducement
not to do so. Even if innocent, the fact that his life, liberty and
property are at stake will result in accused's story being colored so
much in his favor that it will lose much of its value and in addition it will open avenues of cross examination which could well
make the coloration of accused's story appear as outright lies.' 39
A third factor is that defendant's position as the accused, compounded by the tense atmosphere of the trial and the hostility of
the prosecuting attorney, creates within the accused such apprehension- and. excitement that he will be prone toward mistakes.
Any mistakes Will weigh heavily against defendant. The Court in
Wilson said:
It. is not every one who can safely venture on the witness
stand though. entirely innocent of the charge against him.
Excessive..timidity, nervousness when facing others and
attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious charac-136.
137.

59 Me. 298, 8 Am. Rep. 422 (1871).
See
See State
Quinnv.v.Cleayer,
United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1954). "The privilege

though sometimes a shelter to the guilty is often a protection to the innocent." Id. at 162.
138. See State v.-Baker, 115 Vt. 94, 53 A.2d 53 (1947); State v. Cameron, 40 Vt. 455 (1867).
139. See People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522 (1869); Ruloff v. People, 45 N.Y.
213 (1871).

Fall 1965]

NOTES

ter, and offenses charged against him, will often confuse
and embarrass him to such a degree as to increase rather
than remove prejudices against him. It is not everyone,
however honest, who140would, therefore, willingly be placed
on the witness stand.
Even if the accused were capable of presenting a clear,
articulate, honest account of the circumstances upon which his
arrest was based, there would yet remain inducements for him not
to do so. One is that in most jurisdictions, upon accused's taking
the stand in his own defense, he may be questioned in crossexamination as to previous conviction.' 4 ' Disclosure of previous
convictions can be fatally damaging since it will have a tendency
to confuse the legally untrained mind of the juror as to exactly
what accused is on trial for. Moreover, it will strengthen doubts
that jurors have as to the desirability of returning accused to
society. Furthermore, with many jurors it will create the image
of the "criminal mind," bent on committing crime. Theoretically,
the accused is innocent until proven guilty. With the introduction
of accused's prior convictions, however, the burden tends to shift
in the minds of the jurors and the accused becomes guilty until
proven innocent. This result in itself would be sufficient to compel an innocent defendant not to testify. To permit the drawing
of an inference of guilt from accused's failure to testify would,
indeed, be unfair. In fact, proponents of the comment rule often
point to England as an example. England, though permitting
comment by the judge, recognizes this particular problem and
does not allow cross-examination of the defendant as to his criminal record.142 Pennsylvania has adopted the English rule as to
the prohibition of cross-examining accused about his criminal
record.1 43 In addition, however, Pennsylvania forbids. all "adverse" comment.14
Accused may also choose not to testify because of a fear of
incriminating a friend or member of his family. Accused may not
fear facts related to the crime, but rather facts totally unassociated
with the crime. Facts of.unusual, personal. traits that would bring
1 45
scandal to his family may be feared.'
Assuming that all of the preceding justifications for not testifying are true, it is nevertheless contended by advocates of the
comment rule that jurors take into consideration the difficulties
of the accused. They even feel that the jurors will sympathize
140. Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. at 68.
141. See UNIFORM RULE OF EVrDENCE 21. It is recommended that this
rule be changed.
142. Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict. 1, C. 36. See King v. Parker,
[1933] 1 K.B. 850.

143. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (1964).
See Commonwealth v.
Heller, 369 Pa. 457, 87 A.2d 287 (1952).
144. PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 19, § 631 (1964).
145. See Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. at 68.
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with defendant when he does take the stand. Jurors do not expect accused to give an account accurate to its last detail, but they
do want defendant to deny his guilt and to have an opportunity
to "size him up.' 46 The fact that the jury would like to observe
defendant on the stand and hear him deny his guilt is probably
true if for no other reason than that it adds to the drama of the
trial. To attribute to the average juror the ability to understand
the factors that would tend to cause an accused to not testify is to
attribute to the average juror a knowledge of the law that in all
probability he does not possess.
Another justification for the comment rule is advanced in
State v. Cleaver.'4T Silence of the defendant in the face of evidence tending to establish his guilt is similar to that of the silence
of a person in the face of accusation. 148 Silence, as all other
factors tending to link defendant to the crime, may be commented on and submitted for jury consideration. In Adamson
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in supporting the majority opinion, said:
Sensible and just minded men, in important affairs of life,
deem it significant that a man remains silent when confronted with serious and responsible evidence against himself which it is within his power to contradict. The notion
that to allow jurors to do that which sensible and right
minded men do every day violates the 'immutable principles of justice' as conceived by a civilized
society is to
149
trivalize the importance of due process.
The inference that an accused's silence is an indication of his
guilt is invalid. There are many reasons other than guilt that
would induce accused's silence. Moreover, such inference is not
historically founded ether in the law or, notwithstanding Justice
Frankfurter's statement, in the experience of man. 150 It can be
146. See TRAIN, FROM THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 97 (1939);
Terry, ConstitutionalPrivilege Against Forcing Self-Incrimination, 15 YALE
L. J. 127 (1906).
147. 59 Me. 298 (1871).
148. See also State v. Wolfe, 64 S.D. 178, 266 N.W. 116 (1936).

149. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. at 56.
150. In Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 32 A.2d 889 (1943),
examples of historical instances where silence did not create an inference
of guilt are given. In Mark 15:3, 4, 5 it is stated "And the chief priest accused him of many things, but he answered nothing."

And Pilate said,

"Answerest thou nothing? Behold how many things they witness against
thee." Again there was no answer, "so that Pilate marveled." In 1795

Thomas Paine wrote President Washington "an open letter" in which he

said:

"The world will be puzzled to decide whether you are an apostate or

an imposter; whether you have abandoned good principles or never had

any." Washington made no reply and yet history hasn't interpreted his
silence as an admission of guilt. In a memorial address in honor of Roscoe
Conkling before the New York legislature at Albany on May 9, 1888 it was
stated: "He was maligned, misrepresented, and misunderstood, but he
would not answer. He was as silent then as he is now-and his silence,
better than any form of speech, refuted every charge. Id. at 427-29, 32 A.2d
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shown that silence in the face of accusation is not a quality
peculiar to the guilty. Mr. Justice Murphy, dissenting in Adamson,
stated that the "law has a deep respect for those who might prefer
to remain silent before their accusers.' 15 1 The Supreme Court
gave effect to the respect that the law has for those who remain
silent when the Griffin Court held that the self-incrimination
guaranty of the fifth amendment, in its bearing on the states by
reason of the fourteenth amendment, forbids either comment by
or instruction by the court
the prosecution on an accused's silence
152
that such silence is evidence of guilt.
POST-GRIFFIN PROBLEMS
The Griffin decision held that comment was unconstitutional.
The question remains as to what implications could be derived
from the decision. Certainly state statutes, constitutional amendments and constitutional interpretations permitting comment are
now overturned. The possibility exists, however, that comment,
although not officially condoned, could easily be retained as a
prosecutor's tool in state trial procedure. It has been suggested
that prohibiting comment is practically impossible. A prosecutor
can by innuendo or otherwise refer to the fact that defendant has
failed to become a witness. In addition it can be done in such a
way that no error can be predicated upon it. 5 3 A statement which
may appear permissible on the record may have been, by the use of
a raised eyebrow or the intonation of voice, a condemnation. One
solution would be to forbid all comment except a charge by the
judge that no inference should be drawn from defendant's failure
to take the stand and this charge should be given at the option of
the defendant. This is the federal law as announced in United
States v. Bruno.15 4 The Court felt that such instruction, if requested, was necessary to insure that no inference would be drawn
by the jury from accused's failure to testify. In Griffin, the Court
expressly reserved decision on this question. 155 It is submitted
that the Court should extend the fifth amendment prohibition on
comment so as to include the right of a defendant to a jury charge
that his failure to testify does not create an inference of guilt.
It is true that such a charge, though favorable to defendant, could
implant in the mind of the juror the very inference that is sought
to be destroyed. 5 6 Since the charge is to be only at the request
at 892-93.

For other examples, see
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151. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. at 125 (dissenting opinion).
152. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. at 610.
153. See State v. Knapp, 33 S.D. 177, 144 N.W. 921 (1913).
154. 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
155. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 at 615 n.6.
156. E.g., United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 830-31 (2d Cir. 1962),
where defendant's claim that any instruction whatsoever tended to implant
an inference of guilt into a juror'smind was rejected.
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of the defendant, however, it is assumed that the charge will only
be requested when it is in the defendant's best interest. Such a
situation arises when the prosecuting* attorney succeeds in implanting the undesired inference through an innuendo or tone of
voice.
Before comment on accused's failure to testify at the trial
level can be eliminated, an effective method must be developed
for the review of such violations. In People v. Bostich,'5 7 a case
arising after Griffin, the California Supreme Court hinted that
they might dilute the holding of Griffin.158 In Bostich, the judge
and counsel commented on accused's failure to take the stand.
On appeal, California's highest court reversed on other grounds. 6 9
It indicated, however, that there was nothing in Malloy or Griffin
which suggests that every violation of due process is prejudicial
per se.' 60 Hence, if comment occurs at the trial level, the reviewing court need not reverse unless such error resulted in a grave
miscarriage of justice. The Bostich court claimed that the federal
courts are split on whether every violation of due process is prejudicial per se.' 6 ' It is submitted that the better reasoned rule is
that error predicated upon constitutional grounds including a denial of due process under the fourteenth amendment is prejudicial
per se. Comment on accused's failure to take the stand is of such
a nature that efforts to explain it away or caution the jury against
it will not eradicate its adverse effect. One state court felt so
strongly on this matter that they made comment on accused's
failure to testify grounds for reversal on appeal even though such
62
comment was not objected to at trial.
Another suggested method for limiting abuses of accused's
rights is to tape-record both the prosecutor's closing address to the
jury and the judge's charge to the jury. The value of the tape
would be to eliminate reference to accused's failure to testify
through tonal inflection. Further, if a charge as to accused's
right to testify is necessary, a tape will eliminate a ritual-type,
incoherent chant, that on paper meets all the qualifications of the
necessary charge, but in actuality is totally incoherent to the jury.
The expense of making such tapes would be nominal in view of
their value in supplementing the written record. 163
157.
158.
159.

44 Cal. Rptr. 649, 402 P.2d 529 (1965).
Id. at 651, 402 P.2d at 531.
Id. at 659, 402 P.2d at 539. The Bostich court reversed because

the conviction was based in part on pretrial admissions made without the
benefit of counsel or without effective waiver of right to counsel.
160. Id. at 651, 402 P.2d at 531.
161. Id. at 652, 402 P.2d at 531-32.
162.
163.

Burse v. State, 175 So.2d 586 (Fla. 1965).
See Commonwealth v. Miller, 205 Pa. Super. 297, 208 A.2d

867 (1965). A tape recording would have been helpful in determining
this appeal. Here no written record of the prosecutor's closing address was
available. The defendant claimed that the prosecutor had commented on
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A third suggested method of limiting adverse comment on
the trial level is to impose some type of disciplinary measure to
be invoked against the prosecuting attorney who either intentionally or consistently comments upon accused's failure to testify.
Such a disciplinary procedure would not be unfair. The prosecutor is an officer of the court and as such has. a duty to safeguard
the rights of all. 6 4 Disciplinary measures taken against the
prosecuting attorney who comments on accused's failure to testify
would seem to be justified by the Canons of Professional
Ethics. 165
THE PENNSYLVANIA SITUATION: ADVERSE COMMENT
None of the suggested methods of controlling comment will
be of any effect unless it can be decided what statements constitute comment as defined in Griffin. This problem will arise in
states where not all statements are prohibited, but only those
statements which are adverse to the defendant. Although this
appears to be a play on words, in practice it is not. Pennsylvania
originally prohibited all comment. The revised statute, however,
prohibits only adverse comment. 66 In interpreting the difference,
1 7
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Holley
held that reference to the failure of accused to testify must go
further than a mere statement that the evidence for the Commonwealth is uncontradicted. Either the comment must indicate a
duty on the defendant to testify or it must elicit an unfavorable
inference. 168 The Holley rule on comment would seem to be
permissible under a narrow interpretation of Griffin. The Pennsylvania courts could also limit Griffin on facts similar to Commonwealth v. Ross.' 69 Here the court held that statements in the
prosecutor's closing argument referring to defendant's failure to
deny a confession did not infringe upon defendant's constitutional privilege not to take the stand in view of instruction by the
court of such a right. 70 The inference was in all probability
his failure to testify. Luckily, the court did not need to investigate further.
A juror had asked the judge if the failure to testify was a factor they
should consider. The judge's affirmative reply constituted reversible error.
A system of review, however, cannot be based on an inquisitive juror.
164.

See Note, 17

ALA.

L. REv. 321 (1965); Note, 60 W. VA.

L. REV,

375 (1957).
165. The American Bar Association has promulgated Canons of Professional Ethics. Canon 5 provides that "the primary duty of a lawyer
engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but to see that justice is

done." Canon 22 further notes that "a lawyer should not offer evidence
which he knows the court would reject, in order to get the same before the
jury by argument for its admissibility."
166. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 631 (1964).
167. 358 Pa. 296, 56 A.2d 546 (1948).
168. Id. at 300-01, 56 A.2d at 551.
169. 403 Pa. 358, 169 A.2d 780 (1961),
(1961).

170.

Id. at 366, 169 A.2d at 787.

cert. denied, 368 U.S. 904
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implanted already in the jurors' minds. A subsequent instruction
is of little value. It is one thing to have an instruction, requested
by the accused, clarifying exactly what the accused's rights are.
It is another matter to hold that a favorable instruction by the
court could erase the damaging comment of a prosecutor. In the
first instance the charge was at defendant's request. Any inference that might be formed as the result of the charge would have
been due to accused's insistance. In the second instance, however,
the charge was an attempt to salvage defendant's invaded rights.
Future courts should not recognize the favorable instruction as a
cure to the comment violation, even though the Griffin Court
voided such a consideration. 7 '
The Ross decision was not without precedent in Pennsylvania.
In Commonwealth v. Kloiber,172 the trial judge stated that Kloiber
did not deny being at the scene of the crime. The court held
that statement was not reversible error. Since comment was by
the judge, Kloiber is more objectionable than Ross. Earlier in
7
3 defendant's murder conviction
Commonwealth v. Chickerella,1
was sustained even though the court charged the jury that "there
has been no dispute as to the facts; that is to say, the defense has
not made74any denial of the testimony as offered by the Commonwealth."1
The validity of these prior Pennsylvania cases permitting
statements collateral to the defendant's failure to testify remains
a matter of speculation. If Griffin is narrowly construed, many
exceptions will be advanced: a favorable instruction by the judge
might cure any prior comment by the prosecutor; collateral statements, such as "the evidence is uncontradicted" and "the confession was not denied" will pass unchallenged. If, however, Griffin
171.

Cf. Commonwealth v. Miller, 205 Pa. Super. 297, 208 A.2d 867

(1965), decided thirteen days prior to Griffin, gave no indication that the
Pennsylvania courts intended to abandon Ross.

The effect of Griffin,

however, remains to be seen. In Miller, a juror asked the trial judge if he
has the right to take into consideration the fact that the defense made no
attempt to call favorable witnesses. The judge's affirmative answer constituted reversible error. The court, however, also noted the prosecutor's
closing remarks: "Leonard Bleecher was the only witness on behalf of the
defendant; the defendant himself did not take the witness stand." Id. at
299, 208 A.2d at 869. The Miller court hinted that such a statement would
not, in itself, be reversible error since the Pennsylvania statute, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 631 (1964), only prohibits adverse comment.
PENNSYLVANIA TRIAL GuInE § 185 (1959).

See LAUB,

172. 378 Pa. 412, 106 A.2d 820 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 875 (1954).
173. 251 Pa. 160, 96 Atl. 129 (1915).
174. Id. at 163, 96 Atl. at 132.
175. For other Pennsylvania cases permitting comment, see Commonwealth v. Nelson, 294 Pa. 544, 144 Atl. 542 (1929); Commonwealth v. Bova,
180 Pa. Super. 359, 119 A.2d 866 (1956); Commonwealth v. Martin, 34 Pa.
See generally Note, Comment to the Jury on DefendSuper. 451 (1907).
ant's Failure to Testify, 64 Dicx. L. REv. 164 (1960).
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is given the broad interpretation it deserves, such collateral statements will be equally unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION

Once Malloy had extended the fifth amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination to the states, the extension
of a prohibition against comment into the fifth amendment privilege was a logical follow up. The right not to be forced to testify
against oneself is not in reality a right if one can be penalized for
exercising it. Comment is, in fact, such a penalty. The Griffin
decision was both needed and logical. Griffin, standing alone, was
not sufficient to effectively guarantee defendant's right to refrain
from testifying against himself. Griffin did not make clear whether
all comment is prohibited. Griffin left unanswered whether collateral statements were constitutionally prohibited. Nor did the
Griffin Court decide whether defendant could request an instruction in order to clarify his rights to the jury. Griffin failed to
decide if comment upon accused's failure to testify is reversible
per se. Until the above areas are determined, the right against
compulsory self-incrimination extended to state procedure by
Malloy and defined as including a prohibition against comment
in Griffin is not in reality a right, since a state can still effectively
penalize the defendant for exercising it. It is submitted, however,
that Griffin's effect should be extended to the unanswered areas.
No longer can a prosecutor or judge comment on defendant's
failure to testify. Even an appeasing instruction by the judge
should not cure this constitutional violation. It is further suggested that collateral statements drawing an inference that the
defendant is guilty because he failed to testify are constitutionally
prohibited. Lastly, once comment has been injected into the trial,
the defendant has been prejudiced per se and a new trial must
ensue.
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